Critique Of Brainwashing Theories

Brainwashing theories serve the interests of those espousing them in a number of ways. Parents can blame the religious groups and their leaders for volitional decisions by their sons and daughters to participate in such groups. Former members can blame the techniques for a decision which the participant later regrets. "Deprogrammers" can use brainwashing theories as a justification for their new "profession" and as a quasi-legal defense if they are apprehended by legal authorities for their deprogrammings, which often involve physical force and kidnapping. Societal leaders can blame the techniques for seducing society's "best and brightest" away from traditional cultural values and institutions. Leaders of competing religious groups, as well as some psychological and psychiatric clinicians, can attack the groups with brainwashing theories to underpin what are basically unfair-competition arguments. (11) The claim that new religions engage in brainwashing thus becomes a powerful, effective "social weapon" for many partisans in the cult controversy, who use such ideas to label the exotic religious groups as deviant or even evil. (12) However, the new "second generation" brainwashing theories have a number of problems, which will be summarized below.

Misrepresentation of Classical Tradition

Modern brainwashing theories misrepresent earlier scholarly work on the coercive processes developed in Russia, China, and Korea. (13) First, early research by Edgar Schein and by Robert Lifton revealed that, contrary to some recent claims, the techniques were generally rather ineffective at doing more than modifying behavior (obtaining compliance) for the short term. (14) Such theories would thus seem even less useful when trying to explain the long-term changes of behavior and belief, which are implied, if not explicitly alleged, by those propounding brainwashing theories to explain participation in new religions.

Second, the degree of determinism associated with contemporary brainwashing applications usually far exceeds that found in the earlier foundational work of Lifton and of Schein. The "soft determinism" of Lifton and Schein stands in sharp contrast to the "hard determinism" of contemporary proponents of brainwashing theories. (15) The hard determinism approach assumes that through application of sophisticated brainwashing techniques, humans can be turned into robots or "Manchurian Candidates" against their will. Such a perspective does not recognize human beings as the complex and volitional entities they are.

Third, some who produced classic work in this field are not comfortable with their work being applied to modern noncoercive situations. Lifton explicitly disclaims the use of brainwashing theories to attack so-called cults as a legal problem (16) and has stated: "The term [brainwashing] has a far from precise and a questionable usefulness; one may even be tempted to forget about the whole subject and return to more constructive pursuits." (17) The work of Schein and of Lifton both suggest great difficulty in "drawing the line" between acceptable and unacceptable behaviors on the part of those involved in influencing potential subjects for change. (18) Group influence processes operate in all areas of life, which makes singling out one area for special negative attention quite problematic. Such a negative approach cannot be adopted on strictly logical or scientific grounds.

Limited Research Base of Classical Work

Even if the classical work fit the modern experience well, the research base on which that work relied was quite limited. (19) Very small samples were used by both Lifton and Shein, samples which were not necessarily representative of the general populations of those societies. Those included in the samples were described, especially in Lifton's work, using an anecdotal reporting style derived from clinical settings. Lifton studied forty subjects but gave detailed information on only eleven of those. Shein's original work was based on a sample of only fifteen American civilians who returned after imprisonment in China. (20)

Ideological Biases of Brainwashing Theorists

Contemporary applications of brainwashing theories share an ideological bias against collectivistic solutions to problems of group organization. (21) In the 1950s Americans opposed collectivistic communism; in the 1970s and 1980s many Americans shared a concern about communally oriented new religions. Another problematic element of contemporary applications concerns related ethnocentrism and even racism. The fact that a number of new religions are from outside Western culture, and were founded and led by foreigners, should not be ignored by those seeking to understand the propensity to apply simplistic brainwashing theories as an explanation of participation in new religions.

Predisposing Characteristics Ignored

Contemporary application of brainwashing theories to recruitment tactics of new religions also ignores important work on predisposing characteristics. (22) Brainwashing techniques supposedly are so successful that they can transform a person's basic beliefs into sharply contrasting beliefs. This aspect of brainwashing theory is appealing to proponents who have difficulty recognizing that an individual might have been attracted to a new and exotic religion for easily understandable reasons, such as predisposing characteristics.

Therapeutic Effects of Participation Ignored

Participation in new religious groups seems to have a generally positive impact on most participants, an often-replicated finding that undercuts brainwashing arguments but is usually ignored by proponents of such theories. Robbins and Anthony list ten therapeutic effects of participation in new religious groups, including reduced neurotic distress, termination of illicit drug use, and increased social compassion. (23) Richardson reviewed a large literature concerning personality effects of participation, concluding: "[P]ersonality assessments of these group members reveal that life in the new religions is often therapeutic instead of harmful." (24) Psychiatrist Marc Galanter, who has conducted considerable assessment research on participants in prominent new religious groups, has even posited a general "relief effect," a decline in neurotic symptom intensity, brought about by participation in such groups. (25)  Galanter's research was motivated by an interest in discovering how participation leads to such consistent positive effects so that other therapists could apply the techniques themselves. Meredith McGuire found that large numbers of ordinary people participate in exotic religious groups and experiences in search of alternatives to modern medicine, and that many apparently think themselves the better for the experience. (26) Brain washing theorists usually assume that participation in new religions is a negative experience, which is counter to the line of research just cited.

Voluntaristic Character of Participation Overlooked

Brainwashing theorists turn participants' predispositions and interest in exotic religions into susceptibilities and vulnerabilities, adopting an orientation toward recruitment that defines the potential convert in completely passive terms. (27) This view ignores an important aspect of classical work in the brainwashing tradition. Lifton's work clearly shows the voluntaristic character of much of the thought reform that occurred in China. (28) Other scholars discuss the passive orientation of most brainwashing theories and the growing use of "active" (versus passive) paradigms in conversion/recruitment research. (29) Proponents of more activist views of conversion stress the predispositional and volitional character of participation. Such views are derived from research findings that many participants actually seek out the new groups in order to learn about them and experiment with different lifestyles.

Large Research Tradition Ignored

There has been a large amount of research done on recruitment to and participation in the new religious groups and movements, (30) research which brainwashing theorists almost totally ignore. Ms work applies standard theories from sociology, social psychology, and psychology to explain why youth join such groups. The explanations offered by these researchers seem quite adequate to explain participation, without the "black box" of mystical psychotechnology offered by brainwashing theorists.

Lack of Success of New Religions Disregarded

Another obvious problem with assuming the efficacy of powerful recruitment techniques concerns the size of the new religious groups. Most are quite small: the Unification Church probably never had over 10,000 American members, and can now boast only 2000 to 3000 members in the United States; the Hare Krishna may not have achieved even the size of the Unification Church; most other groups have had similar problematic experiences recruiting large numbers of participants. (31) These histories of meager growth and/or rapid decline raise serious questions about the efficacy of brainwashing explanations of participation. Such powerful techniques should have resulted in much larger groups.

A related problem concerns attrition rates for the new religious groups. As a number of scholars have noted, most participants in the new groups remain for only a short time, and most of those who have been recruited simply ignore or rebuff recruiters and continue with their normal lives. (32) Many people leave the groups after relatively short periods. (33) Recruitment techniques as powerful as brainwashing is claimed to be should have led to greater retention, but this is not the case.

Class Origins of Members Not Properly Recognized

A related issue concerns the education level and sophistication of participants. It would seem reasonable to assume that those most susceptible to so-called brainwashing would be less well-educated. However, sizable numbers of "America's finest" in terms of education level and relative affluence have participated in the groups, if only for a short time. (34) This finding raises questions about brainwashing theories as adequate explanations of participation. Researchers have found that there are predisposing characteristics, such as youthful idealism, that have provoked interest in the Unificationist message. (35) Such data would seem to refute claims made by brainwashing theorists.

Brainwashing as Its Own Explanation

A final critique of brainwashing theories is that they are self-perpetuating by virtue of the "therapy" offered to those who leave new religious groups, especially for those who are forcibly deprogrammed. Those who are "successfully" deprogrammed often accept the views that deprogrammers use to justify their actions and that are promoted to the deprogrammee as reasons for cooperating with the deprogramming. These views usually include a belief in brainwashing theories. (36) One could say that a "successful deprogramming" is one in which the deprogramee comes to accept the view that he was brainwashed and is now being rescued. The social psychological truth that such views are learned interpretations or accounts undercuts claims by brainwashing theorists.

Footnotes

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11. See Brock K. Kilbourne & James T. Richardson, Psychotherapy and New Religions in Pluralistic Society, 39 Am. PSYCHOL. 237, 238, 248 (1984).

12. See James T. Richardson et al., Leaving and Labeling. Voluntary and Coerced Disaffiliation from Religious Social Movements, 9 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFUCTIS AND CHANGE 97 (1986); Thomas Robbins et al., Legitimating Repression, in THE BRAINWASHING/DEPROGRAMMING CONTROVERSY, supra note 3.

13. See Anthony, supra note 1, at 298-303; Anthony & Robbins, First Amendment, supra note 1.

14. For the classic statements on which contemporary brainwashing theorists claim to depend, see ROBERT J. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1961); and EDGAR H. SCHEIN ET AL., COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961). For specific critiques of modern uses of brainwashing claims, see AIAN W. SCHEFLIN & EDWARD M. OPTON, JR., THE MIND MANIPULATORS (1978); Donald T. Lunde & Thomas E. Wilson, Brainwashing as a Defense in Criminal Liability, 13 CRIM. L. BULL. 341, 343-52 (1977); James T. Richardson & Brock K Kilbourne, Classical and Contemporary Applications of Brainwashing Theories: A Comparison and Critique, in THE BRAINWASHING/DEPROGRAMMING CONTROVERSY, supra note 3, at 29; and Edgar H. Schein, Brainwashing and Totalitarianization in Modern Society, 2 WORLD POL. 430 (1959).

15. For a presentation of the "hard determinism" perspective, see Margaret T. Singer & R. Ofshe, Thought Reform and Programs and the Production of Psychiatric Casualties, 20 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 188 (1990). For critiques of the Singer-Ofshe approach, see Anthony, supra note 1; Anthony & Robbins, Negligence, supra note 1; and Richardson & Kilbourne, supra note 14.

16. See Robert J. Lifton, Cult Processes, Religious Totalism, and Civil Liberties,in CULTS CULTURE, AND THE LAW 59, 69 (Thomas Robbins et al. eds., 1985) (arguing that the problem of ideological totalism in cults is better addressed educationally than legally).

17. Id. at 4.

18. For more discussion of this point, see Anthony & Robbins, First Amendment, sure note 1.

19. See Anthony, sure note 1, at 322; Albert D. Biderman, The Image of "Brainwashing," 29 PUB. OPIMON Q. 547, 547-50 (1962); Richardson & Kilbourne, sure note 14.

20. See Biderman, sure note 19, at 548.

21. See Richardson & Kilbourne, sure note 14.

22. See Anthony & Robbins, First Amendment, supra note I (pointing out that of the relatively few GI's who stayed in Korea after the War, several were of minority or lower class origins, which may have made them more susceptible to the anti-American message of their Communist captors and that, similarly, many disenchanted youth in America were thereby more interested in religious beliefs and experiences not normally accepted within American society, thus causing them to be more prone to participate in the new groups).

23. Thomas Robbins & Dick Anthony, Deprogramming, Brainwashing, and the Medicalization of Deviant Religious Groups, 29 SOC. PROBS. 283, 290-91 (1992); see also Kilbourne & Richardson, supra note 11.

24. See James T. Richardson, Psychological and Psychiatric Studies in New Religions, in ADVANCES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 209, 221 (L.B. Brown ed.,1985); see also James T. Richardson, Clinical and Personality Assessment of Participants in New Religions, 5 INT'L J. FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 145 (1995) (a more recent lengthy review that reaches the same conclusion).

25. Marc Galanter, The 'Relief Effect".- A Sociobiological Model for Neurotic Distress and Large-Group Therapy, 135 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 588 (1978); see also B. Kilbourne & James T. Richardson, A Social Psychological Analysis of Healing, 7 J. INTEGRATIVE & ECLECTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 20 (1988).

26. MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, RITUAL HEALING IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 3-4 (1988).

27. See especially the work of Richard Delgado, Cults and Conversion: The Case for Informed Consent, 16 GA. L. REV. 533, 546-56 (1982).

28. See LIFRON, supra note 14, at 462-72 (discussing people who volunteered to go through the thought reform process).

29. See Richardson & Kilbourne, supra note 14; James T. Richardson, The Active vs. Passive Convert: Paradigm Conflict in Conversion/Recruitment Research, 24 J. FOR Sci. STUDY RELIGION 163, 167-72 (1985).

30. For some reviews of this large research tradition, see THOMAS ROBBINS, CULTS, CONVERTS AND CHARISMA 63-99 (1988); Arthur L. Greil & David R. Rudy, What Have We Learned From Process Models of Conversion? An Examination of Ten Case Studies, 17 Soc. Focus 305 (1984); and Richardson, supra note 29. For some excellent examples of such work, see Max Heirich, Change of Heart. A Test of Some Widely Held Theories About Religious Conversion, 85 Am. J. Soc. 653 (1977); Thomas Pilarzyk, Conversion and Alteration Processes in the Youth Culture, 21 PAC. Soc. REV. 379 (1978); and Roger A. Straus, Religious Conversion as a Personal and Collective Accomplishment, 40 Soc. ANALYSIS 158 (1979).

31. For examples of the size of some controversial groups, see EILEEN BARKER, THE MAKING OF A MOONIE: CHOICE OR BRAINWASHINA? 65 (1984); E. BURKE ROCHFORD, KRISHNA IN AMERICA 278 (1985).

32. BARKER, supra note 31, at 233-34; Frederick Bird & Bill Reimer, A Sociological Analysis of New Religions and Para-Religious Movements, 21 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 1, 4-6 (1982); Marc Galanter, Psychological Induction in a Large Group: Findings from a Modern Religious Sect, 137 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1574, 1574, 1578-79 (1980).

33. STUART A. WRIGHT, LEAVING CULTS: THE DYNAMICS OF DEFECTION (1987); Richardson et al., supra note 12; Norman Skonovd, Leaving the Cultic Religious Milieu, in THE BRAINWASHING/DEPROGRAMMING CONTROVERSY, supra note 3, at 91.

34. See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 31, at 197-98; JAMES T. RICHARDSON ET AL., ORGANIZED MIRACLES 174 (1979); ROCHFORD, supra note 31, at 48-50.

35. See BARKER, supra note 31, at 205; Brock K. Kilbourne, Equity or Exploitation: The Case of the Unification Church, 28 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 143, 147-48 (1986).

36. See WRIGHT, supra note 33; James R. Lewis, Reconstructing the 'Cult'Experience: Post-Involvement Attitudes as a Function of Mode of Exit and Post Involvement Socialization, 46 Soc. ANALYSIS 151 (1986); Trudy Solomon, Integrating the "Moonie" Experience: A Survey of Ex-members of the Unification Church, in IN GODS WE TRUST 275 (Thomas Robbins & Dick Anthony eds., 1st ed. 1981).